SOME NEW BOOKS.

Loyalists in the American Revolution.

We are indebted to Mr. CLAUDE HALSTEAD VAN TYNE of the University of Pennsylvania for a valuable contribution to our knowledge of certain important features of our national history which only in quite recent times have begun to receive due attention in the volume entitled *The Loyalists in the American Revolution* (Macmillans), we have an account of the formation of the Tory or Loyalist party in the years immediately preceding our Declaration of Independence; of its persecution by the Whigs during a long and fratricidal war, and of the banishment or death of over 100,000 of the most conservative and respectable citizens. The author does not undertake to trace the political and social consequences of their banishment, which has been compared with the expulsion of the Moors from Spain or the exile of the Huguenots from France, but he suggests that the youthful errors of the American Republic in the matters of finance, diplomacy and politics might have been in part corrected or prevented by the presence of that conservative element which had either been driven out of the country or, if permitted to remain, was long deprived of political and social influence because of an unremitting intolerance. Mr. Van Tyne leaves to others an exposition of the results of the compulsory Tory exodus, and confines himself to setting forth the story of the origin and evolution of the Loyalist party. In his quest of materials he has gone for the most part to the original sources. He has examined the laws of each of the thirteen colonies during the whole period of the Revolution and he has learned from the Transcript of the Manuscript Books and Papers of the Commission of Inquiry into the Losses and Services of the American Loyalists," whether the laws were really carried out in all their ostensible severity. The process of verification has been further by an inspection of the public records of the original States. The newspapers of the day have also been consulted, including *Rivington's Gazette*, the foremost newspaper advocate of Loyalism from 1774 until the close of the war. The letters and journals of such Loyalists as Hutchinson, Curwen, Van Schaack and John Murray, and the pamphlets of Galloway and others, have likewise proved of much utility.

What elements of American society were loyal to the British Crown before the passage of the Boston Port bill and the occupation of Boston by a British garrison? Our author thinks that, before the coming of the British soldiers, the elements of the active Tory party may be fairly enough distributed in a few well-defined classes. There were, in the first place, the office-holding Tories, whose incomes depended on the existing *régime*. Closely linked with these were those gregarious persons whose friends were among the official class. Doubtless many of the Anglican clergy had motives similar to those of the Crown officers. With these men drifted the conservative people of all social grades. Another type of man who listened and yielded rather to metaphysical considerations than to concrete facts was the dynastic Tory, the King-Worshipper. Others who were convinced that Parliament had a right to tax are defined by our author as legality-Tories. Both these last-mentioned types were reinforced by the religious Tory, whose dogma was "Fear God and honor the King." Finally, there were the factional Tories, whose action was determined by family feuds and old political animosities. Thus, in New York, the De Lancey party was forced into opposition to the so-called patriots, because the Livingston party, its ancient enemy, had embraced the Whig principles. It is suggested that in Massachusetts the antipathy of the Otises to Governor Bernard aided the formation of the Revolutionary party. With the actual outbreak of war came new accessions to the active supporters of the British, especially when issues arose on the subjects of the Continental Congress, the Declaration of Independence and the French alliance. Particularly important is it to remember, what is too often overlooked, that contentment with the old order of things was the normal state, and that men had to be converted to the Whig or Revolutionary views, rather than to the Tory or Loyalist position.

Mr. Van Tyne holds that, in failing to prevent the assembling of delegates to the Continental Congress, the Tories lost their last political opportunity. Instead of taking an energetic part in the colonial politics of the period, they remained for the most part impassive. Joseph Galloway, for instance, testifies that, in the election of delegates to the second Continental Congress from Pennsylvania, very small proportions of the people turned out to vote. In one place, he said, two men would meet and one would appoint the other a delegate to the Congress. In many districts a decimal part, and in some not a hundredth part, of the voters were present. Gov. Martin of North Carolina wrote Lord Dartmouth that ten of the thirty-four counties of that State sent no representatives to the provisional convention called for the purpose of appointing delegates to the second Continental Congress. In some of the districts that were represented committees of ten or twelve men would take it upon themselves to name the delegates to the provincial convention. In still other districts the Representatives were chosen by not a twentieth part of the people, "notwithstanding every act of persuasion had been employed by the demagogues upon the occasion." In Georgia the Loyalist influence was so strong that only five out of twelve parishes sent deputies to a provincial convention which met for the purpose of appointing delegates to the Continental Congress. Notwithstanding the fact that they represented only a minority in the province, these five parishes elected delegates, who, however, from fear or modesty refused to serve, and sent a letter of explanation to Philadelphia. In New York the Loyalists were more active, and in some Long Island districts the records show heavy majorities against sending representatives to a provincial convention which was to appoint delegates to the Continental Congress. In spite of such adverse majorities, delegates were sent from these districts by small bodies of patriots who relied upon outside support to secure admission for them to the convention. Lieut.-Gov. Colden asserted that in Queens county not six persons had met for the purpose of choosing delegates to the convention. In New York city a desperate attempt was made to arouse the conservative forces against the proposed congress. The attempt failed, but our author thinks that the New York delegation to Philadelphia, felt restrained by the consciousness that they represented only a minority.

The opinion is expressed in the book before us that in 1768 Samuel Adams probably stood alone in the belief that America must become independent. Even as late as 1775 many of the leading patriots had not gone so far on the road to rebellion. Washington, for instance, was not sure that the war was to be one for independence when he took command at Cambridge. Jefferson denied that armies had been raised with a desire of separation from England. Franklin would willingly have pledged his private fortune to compensate the East India Company for its losses through the Boston Tea Party. Not long before the close of 1775 a delegate to the Continental Congress said with horror that he had heard of persons in America who wished to break off with Great Britain, and that "a proposal had been made to apply to France and Spain." He threatened to inform his constituents, and added, "I apprehend the man who should propose it would be torn to pieces like De Witt." In a word, the responsible statesmen of America were slow to advocate the doctrine of independence, until, in the winter of 1775-76, obscure song writers and newspaper humorists set the idea buzzing in the minds of discontented men. Among the agencies which told powerfully for independence, the publication of Paine's "Common Sense" was conspicuous.

We are reminded that John Adams asserted many years later that in the early part of 1776 "New York and Pennsylvania were so nearly divided—if, indeed, their propensity was not against independence—that, if New England on the one side and Virginia on the other had not help them in awe, they would have joined the British." Timothy Pickering called Pennsylvania "the enemy's country," and Curwen thought that the Quakers and Dutchmen had too great regard for ease and property to sacrifice either on the altar of an unknown goddess of rather doubtful divinity. Mr. Van Tyne has no doubt that in that colony "the proprietary government was able to wield a powerful opposition. It was not forced by the Quakers, who wished to avoid war on any terms. In convention they denounced the putting down of Kings and Governments, asserting that such action was God's prerogative and not men's. They proclaimed a horror of measures tending to independence. This gentle and peaceable disapproval, enforced by the conservatism of the Pennsylvania Germans, delayed favorable action by that colony until the mass meeting at the State House in the middle of May, 1776, denounced the act of the Pennsylvania Assembly, which had instructed its delegates in Congress to oppose independence. This event simply meant that the party favorable to independence, failing to control the legally elected Legislature, had now resorted to extra-legal means to defeat the evident wish of the legal majority." It is pointed out in a footnote that this majority was only of the limited number to whom the suffrage had been restricted. The people at large were appealed to by the Whigs, and late in June the extra-legal convention called by them falteringly pledged the colony to independence.

In Maryland so great was the popularity of the Governor, Robert Eden, that the Tory party possessed great strength. Nothing but the active campaign carried on by Samuel Chase and Charles Carroll in every county won that colony to the side of independence. In Virginia there had been a very even balance of forces, but the action of the Governor, Lord Dunmore, gradually estranged the loyal people of the colony. He first threatened to free, and then freed by proclamation, all the negroes and indentured servants who should enlist for the purpose of reducing the colony to subjection. Subsequently, his relentless burning of Norfolk, the principal seaport of the colony, gave Virginia as good a reason as Massachusetts for wishing independence.

The varying fortunes of the war greatly influenced the strength of both parties. From this fact our author draws an inference that has often been lost sight of. "It is just that great mass of the Americans which was always ready to move toward the point of least resistence that has been least regarded by those who have sought to frame a theory of the American Revolution. That mass has never been an inviting object for the contemplation of either the Whig or Tory sympathizers. As a result, one student has pronounced the Revolution the work of 'an unscrupulous and desperate minority;' while another has declared that it was 'the settled conviction of the people that the priceless treasure of self-government could be preserved by no other means.' A study of the political struggle between the Whig and the Tory seems to show that at both extremes of political thought there was a small body of positive and determined men, while between them lay the wavering, neutral masses, ready to move unresistingly in the direction given by the success of either Whig or Tory. Leagued with the positive Tory minority was the British Government, while the Whig minority began the struggle with the aid of the great natural advantages of a field vast and far-removed from the resources of the enemy. Then the aid of foreign alliances turned the tide steadily and irresistibly toward Whig victory, and, as the trend of events became evident to the mass of neutral Americans, they also joined the favorable flood, and assured the ultimate success."

In view of this state of facts, Mr. Van Tyne declines to recognize the deserter as necessarily a rascal. In many cases, no doubt, he might be induced by the "difference between doubloons and rags" to quit an unprofitable service for one more beneficial. Many a deserter, however, had a more laudable motive. He might be only a thoughtless fellow who had been carried into rebellion by the enthusiasm of other men possessed of more positive convictions. Then some terrible calamity to the American cause, some real suffering and privation, or a proclamation containing a terrible threat, or a fearful reminder that he was a traitor, brought him to a realization of the true situation. A revulsion of feeling brought back all his natural conservatism, and he made the best of his earliest opportunity to join the cause to which his conscience bound him. Our author points out that the Tories understood the nature of this neutral body of men far better than did the British, and constantly urged the British commanders to send skeleton regiments into the neutral districts with arms to be distributed among the loyal men, who would at once flock to the King's standards. Joseph Galloway, the most active of all the Loyalists, pleaded earnestly for such an experiment, but his advice, like most other counsel offered to the British by the Tories, was unheeded.

To what extent did the Loyalists render the British military service during the Revolutionary War? Our author estimates that "New York alone furnished 15,000 men to the British Army and Navy, and over 8,000 Loyalist militia. All of the other colonies furnished about as many more, so that we may safely state that 5,000 soldiers either Regular or militia, were drawn into the service of Great Britain from her American sympathizers." We should bear in mind, moreover, that, even when the Loyalists failed to join the British troops, their known presence in large numbers among the inhabitants of a given region prevented the Whig militia levied therein from joining the American forces. The British soldiers were greatly aided, also, in the matter of supplies by the Tory inhabitants.

The assistance given them by the Loyalists was but ill appreciated by the British troops. The officers and soldiers treated the Tories with a cold tolerance and never gave them a warm and sincere reception. From their point of view the loyal as well as the rebellious Americans were "our colonists," not equals. Galloway, who did the British more service than any other genuinely American Loyalist, always smarted under Howe's neglect. These two men, the greatest of the Loyalists, and the commander of the British forces lived side by side for seven months in Philadelphia, and Howe called on Galloway but once in all that time. It is probable enough that this low estimate of the Tories cost the British dearly. In the judgment of a contemporary Tory writer, much of Cornwallis's early success was due to the fact that *he* treated a Loyalist like a friend embarked in the same cause. What the Tories might have done was shown at the battle of Camden, where it was Tarleton's cavalry and Rawdon's Volunteers of Ireland, raised in Pennsylvania, that carried the day. Nearly 2,400 Tories took part in that terrible defeat of Gates. Nor was mere neglect the only injury which the Loyalists suffered from the British armies. Although, for political reasons, the British officers sought to shield the Tories from plunder, the common soldiers, who held all Americans in contempt, were hard to restrain. Galloway said that Loyalists had come to him with tears in their eyes, complaining that they had been plundered of everything in the world, even of the pot to boil their victuals.

Of course, the news of the treaty of peace, a treaty which did not guarantee the restoration of their property or even assure to them protection from acts of violence, threw the Tories into the depths of despair. It will be remembered that the British plenipotentiaries had contented themselves with a mere promise that Congress would recommend to the States a conciliatory policy with reference to the Loyalists. It was not surprising that chivalrous Englishmen as well as Loyalists denounced as shameful a peace which proclaimed the British as beaten cowards incapable of safeguarding the adherents to their wretched fortunes. There is no doubt, however, that England got for the Loyalists the utmost attainable in the treaty, and that later she showed herself honorable and generous in the highest degree by compensating the Loyalists out of her own treasury. Large land grants were given to Tory refugees in Nova Scotia and in upper Canada, and some nine million dollars were expended for the benefit of the refugees in those provinces before 1787. The total amount of compensation granted by the British Government to their American adherents is computed at thirty millions of dollars.

The purport of this interesting volume is summed up in a few words: "The cause of the Loyalists failed, but their stand was reasonable and natural. They were the prosperous and contented men, the men without a grievance. Conservatism was the only policy that one could expect of them. Men do not rebel to rid themselves of prosperity. Prosperous men seek to conserve prosperity. The Loyalist obeyed his nature as truly as the patriot, but as events proved chose the ill-fated cause, and when the struggle ended his prosperity had fled and he was an outcast and an exile."

M. W. H.

Glimpses of Our Naval History.

A number of papers read before the Military Historical Society of Massachusetts has been issued under the collective title *Naval Actions and History*, from the Griffith-Stilling Press, Boston. Of these ten papers, those on "The Old Navy," on "The Home Squadron in the Winter of 1860-61," and on "The Siege of Charleston," were read by Rear Admiral George E. Belknap; the "Story of the Cumberland" was recounted by Rear Admiral Thomas O. Selfridge, Jr.; the "Story of the Monitor," by Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce; the account of "The Battle of Mobile Bay" was given by Commodore Foxhall A. Parker; the record of "The Naval Brigade" was compiled by Lieut. John C. Soley. The "Personal Reminiscences of the War, 1861-65," were read by Lieutenant-Commander William G. Saltonstall; a description of the "Hurricane at Samoa," in March, 1889, is set forth by Rear Admiral Lewis A. Kimberly, while "The Battle of Manila Bay" is described by Capt. Asa Walker, who commanded the Concord in that engagement. An enumeration of the names suffices to show that the several subjects are treated by officers peculiarly qualified for their respective tasks. Taken together, the papers constitute a valuable contribution to the history of the American Navy.

In the paper on "The Old Navy," the writer, Admiral Belknap, recalls some interesting examples of the propensity that used to be evinced by representatives of the British Navy to brow beat American officers. During the first quarter of the last century our British friends still resented our separation from the mother country, and missed no opportunity of exhibiting the feeling. We quote an illustrative incident: "One evening in the British port of Malta in the Mediterranean in 1803, Midshipman Bainbridge and some of his companions were in the lobby of a theatre there. In their heating, the Military Secretary to the Governor, Sir Alexander Ball, said: 'These Yankees will never stand the smell of powder,' following up the remark by brushing up offensively against Bainbridge. The intent of the insult was but too manifest. Quick as thought Bainbridge knocked the offender down and a challege ensued. The then Lieutenant Stephen Decatur, acting as Bainbridge's second, and as the challenged party, chose pistols at four paces—twenty feet. The Britisher was known to be a practised duellist, sure at ten paces; and his second objected to the shorter distance, saying to Decatur, 'This looks like murder!' 'No, sir,' replied Decatur, 'this looks like death; your friend is an expert duellist; mine is wholly inexperienced; the shorter distance will make things more equal.' Decatur carried his point, for he was clearly in the right. The two men took their places and waited for the word. At the first fire Bainbridge's ball passed through his antagonist's hat; the Secretary missed his aim altogether. Once more they stood on the line and this time the Englishman fell to the ground mortally shot, while Bainbridge stood unharmed. Sir Alexander Ball tried to make a diplomatic matter of the affair, but it was seen that his Secretrary had deliberately insulted the American and had courted the encounter."

Admiral Belknap also recalls how Tattnall, whose chivalric act and generous declaration that "blood is thicker than water" at the Peiho, in 1859, was so heartily applauded among all English-speaking folk, challenged and wounded a British officer of Lord Cochrane's fleet at Valparaiso in 1819. "Some time after Tattnall's own affair, he acted as a second to Midshipman Pinckney of the Macedonian, who had also challenged an English officer of Cochrane's fleet. In this case the second of the British officer refused to abide by the terms that had been agreed upon—ten paces. After much altercation, Tattnall strode up to the English second, and said to him: 'You are a coward and a scoundrel; you have made all this difficulty. Now you shall first fight me at five paces!' The English second backed down and apologized and the duel proceeded. Several shots were exchanged, and the clothing of both principals was cut; but finally, the Englishman was wounded, and the affair came to an end. Tattnall's part had been so prominent and decided that the officers of the British flagship in port, sympathizing with their countrymen of Cochrane's fleet, indulged in comments which Tattnall resented. He, therefore, sent word on board by a responsible messenger to the effect that, if his course had in any way displeased them, he would be most happy to fight them of all grades, from 'the cockpit to the cabin-door.'" It seems that the late Commodore Stockton, when First Lieutenant of the Erie up the Mediterranean in 1816, had at one time accepted challenges to fight from all the captains of a British regiment stationed at Gibraltar, and several meetings took place. Such lessons, as Admiral Belknap says, were sternly educational as to the manner of man the American officer was and is.

With regard to the present personnel of the navy, the author of this paper feels that he can speak the more freely as having retired from active duty. He recognizes that the differences in the types of ships and the changes in motive power and guns have brought about perceptible alterations in the character of the enlisted men. The skill demanded of them is of a more mechanical order, and one misses some of the characteristics which made the old man-of-wars-man so attractive and such an admirable sailor. We are assured, however, that the new man is imbued with the same loyal devotion to the flag that possessed the souls of our seamen in Revolutionary days, in the War of 1812 and during the War of the Rebellion, and may be depended upon to do equally gallant service. As to the officers, Admiral Belknap is convinced that no service in the world can match them. "In every branch they are superior in education and training to the officers of any other service—men so well grounded and practised, schooled and equipped, that their services are sought in many directions. Many officers, indeed, have resigned their commissions for the higher pay and greater civil advantages eagerly tendered them by individuals and firms, colleges and corporations, than the Government affords. We have officers to-day, graduates from our Naval Academy at Annapolis, and from civil colleges in the land, who can take the metal from the mine, and put it through all the processes of preparation and manufacture, until it appears in completed form in the hulls and engines, boilers and dynamos, guns and armor, shells and torpedoes, of our ships of war. Expert as electricians, they invent or improve electrical appliances; as chemists, they manufacture the needed explosives for naval use; as inventors, the guns and gun carriages of our navy, since the days of Dahlgren, have been designed by them in their every part and built under their supervision. The guns turned out at the naval gun factory at Washington are not excelled by Krupp or any other fabricator of heavy ordnance in Europe; as linguists and mathematicians, naturalists and adepts in therapeutics and surgery, sanitation and hygiene they have won world-wide fame as hydrographers they have no superiors, whether in surveying the coasts and harbors of the globe, or in sounding the depths of the sea. Equally at home in the handling of infantry and artillery on shore, they lead the world as versatile and accomplished officers on shipboard." A similar opinion was expressed, we are told, by President Roosevelt in a letter addressed by him to the author of this paper: "I do not think that there is a body of men in this country, or in any country, that, on the whole, stands as the equal of our navy officers."

Admiral T. O. Selfridge, Jr., who relates "The Story of the Cumberland," was a Lieutenant on that vessel when she, a wooden ship, engaged the ironclad *Merrimac* and, against unparalleled odds, continued to fight till she went down. This eye-witness of the memorable action points out that the *Merrimac* was more than double the size of the *Cumberland*; that the former vessel had armor four inches thick to oppose to the wooden sides of the latter, and, further, that the former was enabled to take any position at will, while the latter was chained to the bottom, and helpless to move. Under the circumstances, there would have been no dishonor in surrendering; but what would have been the result? Admiral Selfridge answers: "The *Merrimac*, fresh from the surrender of the *Cumberland*, would have destroyed the fine steam frigate *Minnesota* that had grounded while going to the assistance of the *Cumberland*; would have captured the remaining naval force at Hampton Roads, consisting of the frigate *Roanoke*, which had lost her screw, and the sailing frigate *St. Lawrence*. Thus, when the *Monitor* arrived late that Saturday night, she would have found herself alone. "What," asks the Admiral, "would have been the fate of the *Monitor* when she was rammed by the *Merrimac* on the second day's fight if the latter had not lost her spur in the *Cumberland's* side?" It is a melancholy fact that our Government bestowed neither promotion nor medals upon the officers and crew of the *Cumberland*, who fought her until she sank, and that only some years afterward was an appropriation made for a month's pay to the survivors, in consideration of the loss of their effects.

Rear Admiral Stephen B. Luce describes the immediate and ultimate consequences of the victory virtually won by the *Monitor* in her engagement with the *Merrimac*. It is well known that, after four hours' fighting, the *Merrimac* withdrew to the Norfolk Navy Yard, leaving the *Monitor* in undisputed possession of the field. "The immediate consequences were"—we quote from Admiral Luce—"that the *Minnesota*, which was about to be abandoned and destroyed by her own people, now relieved from further molestation, was floated and soon after anchored off Fort Monroe. The *Roanoke* and *St. Lawrence* were saved from destruction and the large fleet of merchant vessels and army transports in the Roads were freed from capture. All apprehension of the raising of the blockade, either in the Chesapeake or on the coast, ceased. Fort Monroe, relieved from the possibilities of attack, rendered the Peninsula campaign practicable." The *Merrimac*, after certain repairs had been completed at the Norfolk Navy Yard, reappeared, but, considered as a factor in the military operations on the James River, she was completely neutralized by the *Monitor*, and was finally destroyed by her own people as no longer of any fighting value. Admiral Luce goes on to show how marked was the effect produced abroad by the engagement. Mr. Adams, our Minister to England, wrote home under date of April 3, 1862: "The late naval action in Hampton Roads has made a great sensation, and is regarded as likely to work a complete change in the policy of this country [England] in fortifications and the naval marine. You will not fail to observe the notice already taken of it in Parliament. The opinion of the military and naval efficency of the United States has undergone an astonishing change within the last month." Mr. Thomas Dudley, who at the time of the battle was United States Consul at Liverpool, expressed the deliberate opinion that "this fight between the *Monitor* and the *Merrimac* did more to preserve the peace between England and the United States than any other event that took place during the war." Admiral Luce also recalls the fact that Admiral Colomb, an officer of the British Navy, who had given much time and study to the subject of naval warfare, has declared that "in the American Civil War the deciding battle was that between the *Monitor* and the *Merrimac*, and no one can doubt that if the *Merrimac* had gained the victory there would scarcely now be the United States of America. The fate of that nation was decided then and there."

One of the most striking papers in this volume is Commodore Foxhall A. Parker's description of the "Battle of Mobile Bay." It will be remembered that, opposed to Farragut were strong land fortifications, and that the Confederate vessels included the ironclad ram Tennessee, which, at one time, engaged the whole of the Union fleet, and that the Confederate defences included also submarine torpedoes, by one of which the Tecumseh was blown up. But for Farragut's great qualities as a commander the battle would twice have been lost and the greater part of the Union fleet destroyed. Commodore Parker does full justice to the bravery and tenacity with which the Confederates fought. "Remembering," he says, "that, of the actors in this strife, all were Americans, we glory not in our victory, save as these have tended to the restoration of the Union. God grant that, when the next war comes, in every fight, whether by land or sea, we may stand shoulder to shoulder, and side by side with the Star-Spangled Banner, the emblem of equal rights for all, waving above our heads, and not a single sectional flag to be seen upon the battlefield."

In his recollections of the Battle of Manila Bay Capt. Asa Walker directs attention to the untoward conditions under which the engagement took place. We are reminded that the fleets of former days which kept the sea for months, subsisting their officers and crews on the supplies stored in their capacious holds, required no space in their interior for the accommodation of their motive power. Of the modern man-of-war, on the other hand, coal may be considered as the life-blood; upon a due supply of this combustible depends the existence of the vessel as an effective instrument. In proportion to the space required for coal and machinery, the room available for provisions has been diminished. A stock of food for from forty-five to ninety days is the utmost that can now be counted upon. It is these facts that Capt. Walker has in mind when he says: "Fancy this little squadron of six ships, the largest under 6,000 tons, and the smallest of only 800, setting forth to do battle in an enemy's waters, 7,000 miles from a home port, with no base of supply vessels, except the two small steamers accompanying it, with all neighboring ports closed by the stern laws of neutrality, and with no hope of aid from any source. Can it be wondered at that our friends at Hong Kong prognosticated the most direful results and designated our enterprise as 'Yankee temerity?'" Moreover, the small fleet under Commodore Dewey put forth in ignorance of the obstacles which it might have to encounter. Capt. Walker recalls that, during the stay at Hong Kong, every endeavor had, of course, been made to ascertain the strength and position of the Spanish fleet stationed in Philippine waters, and to find out the location of all forts and mines. These efforts to acquire trustworthy information had been, however, but partially successful. "That our squadron was superior in weight of metal to theirs we had no doubt, but we could get no reliable knowledge of the batteries in and about Manila and Subig bays. If met in the open, we felt assured that the Spanish squardon would be destroyed, but how about the batteries? Our Consul at Manila, Mr. Williams, had from the first zealously striven to accumulate all information accessible to him, but being a suspect, all of his movements were watched and his opportunities minimized, so that, as far as land defences and mines were concerned, he was able to give but the vaguest rumors." How the fight ended is well known. Every one of the vessels composing the Spanish fleet was destroyed; the forts were captured, and Manila must have been surrendered, but for Dewey's lack of sufficient troops to police the city. The victorious fleet was compelled to await the arrival of an adequate number of soldiers before taking possession of Manila, but meanwhile a strict blockade of the harbor was proclaimed and enforced. We suppose that never was a victory so momentous in its consequences gained at so small a cost. It may be remembered that not a single man on board the American fleet was killed, and but eight were slightly wounded. Three ships of the squadron were untouched, and the injuries to the other three were of the most trivial character. Practically the squadron was in good as condition for action after the engagement was over as it had been when the fight began.

Germany of To-day.

In the volume entitled *Germany*, by WOLF VON SCHIERBRAND (Doubleday, Page & Co.), we have a first-hand study of the institutions, ideas, aims, acquirements and achievements of our German contemporaries considered from a German-American point of view. The author tells us in a preface that a recent long residence in Germany enabled him to come in close contact with every phase of German life, and afforded exceptional opportunities for obtaining a faithful reflex of rapidly changing conditions. Several chapters are devoted to the Emperor William II. In others the Socialist movement, the Agrarian movement and the Polish problem are examined. Adequate attention is also paid to commerce and manufacturing, to the tariff problem, to shipping and to the tremendous increase of the German Navy which is now under way. The German experiments in colonization are reviewed. Elsewhere the author investigates the juristic and educational systems of Germany; neither does he overlook such subjects as literature, art and journalism. Taken as a whole, the book undoubtedly will materially aid the reader to form correct conclusions concerning the social, political and industrial aspects of German civilization, and also to explain why Germany has accomplished less in certain directions than might have been looked for. We are reminded in the preface that "vague ideas exist of the high culture of Germany, of the thorough technical training and of the enormous capacity for taking pains, which qualifications the typical German possesses in a high degree. These characteristics might be expected by an outsider to give Germany a decided superiority in the struggle for material and political development. Those, however, who have lived on the inside know that these great advantages are offset by dangers and weaknesses." Every chapter of this book ought to be read, and we can but faintly indicate its usefulness by singling out for particular notice what the author has to tell us about the German Socialists.

Mr. von Schierbrand begins his chapter on the subject by recalling the assertion made by the young Kaiser William II. a fortnight after his accession to the throne. "We will make short work of the Socialist movement," he told Prince Bismarck. "Leave that to me. I shall win them over to my side inside a year." As a matter of fact, fourteen years have since elapsed, and the Socialist party has grown to more than double the strength which it then possessed. Measured by the number of its votes it represents to-day one-quarter of the German people; but, in our author's opinion, even that high estimate is probably below the truth. "Whoever lives in Germany cannot help mingling daily, almost hourly, knowingly or unknowingly, with Socialists. The valet who gives you admission to his master's drawing room may be a Socialist. In the ante-chamber of Count von Bulow, the Imperial Chancellor, you are likely to meet one. In every Government department Socialists are employed by the score. Nay, the Kaiser himself, do what he will, has Socialists at his court and in his immediate *entourage*." Only by the omnipresence of its representatives is the enormous influence of the Socialist party explicable. The extent to which the ramifications of Socialism have been carried in Germany was brought out clearly, it seems, by the Mayor of Kolberg in a controversy with a Government official about the renting of a public hall to a body of the followers of Karl Marx. "He who does not want to sit where Socialists have sat," said the Mayor, "will nowadays be somewhat embarrassed to find a seat anywhere in Germany; at least he cannot any longer travel in railway carriages. What we eat and drink is for the most part made by Socialists. Our clothes have been manufactured by Socialists. You cannot live in a new house in the building of which Socialists have not been engaged. In short, to avoid Socialists, or to stigmatize them as a class outside of the pale of respectable society, is absolutely futile. Only by acknowledging them as a public factor, on an equality with all other public factors, can the social peace be furthered." It may well astonish a foreigner, however, to find that at least one in every four men he meets in Germany belongs to a political organization which has inscribed upon its banners the obliteration of the present state of government, the abolition of monarchies and the supersession of the immense standing army by a much vaster body of militia—a party, in fine, that looks upon the present state as its mortal enemy.

How are we to account for the fact that the Socialist vote, which in 1878-79 was but 312,000, rose in 1893 to 2,107,000? Mr. von Schierbrand explains that the Socialist strength has been acquired at the expense of the Liberal factions. The hold which these factions once possessed on the masses of the German people is entirely gone. One by one the election districts controlled for generations by the Liberals have surrendered to Socialism. The industrial and manufacturing centres in the Rhenish and Westphalian provinces, and nearly all the large cities with their rapidly growing population of operatives, have become strongly Socialistic. Berlin and its suburbs, comprising a population of two and a half millions, has an enormous Socialist majority. So has Hamburg, Breslau, Dresden, Leipzig, Chemnitz, Altona, Stettin, Königsberg, Danzic, Nuremberg and nearly all other large urban centres. Under these circumstances, the Socialists would be far more powerful than they are in the Reichstag but for the Government's refusal to reapportion the electoral districts according to population. The election districts of Germany are still the same as they were in 1871, although since that time the urban ones have in many cases doubled, trebled and even quadrupled in size, while the rural ones have actually diminished. If a just redistricting could be brought about, Berlin, with its suburbs, would alone send seventeen Socialists to the Reichstag, instead of seven, as at present. There would then be, instead of sixty-three, about one hundred and twenty Socialist delegates in the national assembly, out of a total of 397, and the Conservatives would be reduced to less than fifty, against their present ninety-one, while the Catholic party of the Centre, instead of 107, which it now has, would muster barely sixty. With the more radical Liberal wing—which now numbers a pitiful two score, but under a redistricting would have at least sixty members—and with a portion of the numerous Independents, the Socialists would then be the dominant legislative factor in imperial affairs.

Our author's comment on this state of things is: "It is not astonishing that the Government and the parties now controlling legislation should do their utmost to avert such a contingency. In fact, both the Government and the more extreme factions in the Reichstag that usually side with the Government harbor the design of curtailing the general franchise in order to perpetuate their present power, lest, even under the present unfavorable conditions, the Socialists should attain control, a thing which, if we may judge by the signs of the times, there is abundant reason to fear. The by-elections that have taken place during the last two years to fill vacancies caused by death or resignation have, with one or two exceptions, all resulted in Socialist victories, even in former strongholds of other parties. The whole trend of affairs, in fact, seems to point to very large Socialist increases at the next general election in 1903. It is probable that the Socialist gains will be larger than at any previous election." Our author adds that this design of curtailing the general franchise, either by attaching to the ballot the condition of a stipulated minimum of taxation or by some other discrimination which would disfranchise large numbers of the lower classes, has thus far met with determined resistance on the part of the Reichstag majority, composed of the entire Left and part of the Centre. But while there does not seem to be any chance of executing it in the near future, the plan exists, and when the Government deems its execution indispensable the Kaiser and his advisers may find means, through coercing or otherwise influencing the Reichstag, or through an infringement of the Constitution, to disfranchise a large section of the Socialists.

It is, however, to be borne in mind when we come to the most valuable part of the chapter devoted to the subject—that, even if the Socialists should obtain control of the Reichstag, it has ceased to be certain that they would attempt to carry out their party programme as it was framed by their earlier leaders, Marx and Engels. Of the orthodox socialism that was taught up to a decade ago as integral and vital part was the dream of a bloody uprising of the lower against the upper classes and the present form of government, to be followed by a complete reorganization of society on the basis of State control of all the means of production and distribution.

Within German socialism, however, a strong counter-current has been developed during the last ten or a dozen years. Our author testifies to the reality and importance of this phenomenon. "There has been a steady and increasing inclination to lop off from the parent tree those revolutionary branches, and to confine the party, in creed as well as in practical aims, to a set of reforms which, radical as they are, and diametrically opposed to the class interests of the dominating factors in Germany, could nevertheless, be carried out on peaceable lines, and could easily find a place within the present order of society. In its main features this revised programme, though out of deference to the feelings of their old-time leaders it has not been adopted in so many words, not even at the last party convention, is that of a radical reform and labor party. It includes state control of all means of communication and of all factories, mines, shipyards, &c., with the voices of the owners and those of the toilers co-ordinated, and it provides for a minimum of wages and a maximum of hours of labor. It does away, however, with any violent upheaval, accompanied by forcible dispossession, and it does away with nearly every paragraph in the earlier creed to which other political parties, no matter how friendly disposed otherwise to the just demands of labor, have had all along strong objections." Mr. von Schierbrand, for his part, has no doubt that, although this new programme has not so far been formally adopted by the Socialists of Germany as a party, largely for sentimental reasons, an overwhelming proportion of their voters have really accepted it as their true aim and wish.

The great change that has been wrought in the aims and convictions of the Socialist masses in Germany is attributed to two great causes. The first of these is the altered character of the rank and file. As we have seen, immense accessions have come to the Socialist party during the last ten years from the various factions of the whilom great Liberal party in Germany, and also from the party of the Centre, especially in the industrial districts of the Catholic, Rhine and Westphalian provinces, and in some parts of the Polish-speaking districts of Silesia. These recruits, becoming more and more numerous, had, for the most part, little faith in the sanguinary features of the old Socialist programme, but they firmly believed in the desirability of the practicable reforms advocated by the party. Our author points out, however, that their mere numerical weight, great as it was, would not be sufficient to turn the scale. "There was much brain-power used in the same direction, and the head and front of the intellectual warfare waged against the earlier dogmas of Socialism was Bernstein, for twenty years an exile from Germany—like so many other of the ablest Socialists driven out by Bismarck under his repression laws." During the last years of his stay in England, Bernstein wrote and published a series of books and pamphlets which exercised a powerful influence in Germany, and have done more than any other single thing to mould anew the doctrines on which theoretical Socialism is built. Yet his main work in this line has been done since his return to Germany. In quick succession he issued a number of pithily written and convincing tracts, wherein he demolished, one after the other, the strongest pillars upon which the old Socialist structure, considered as a scientific, political and economic system, rested, to wit, the dogma of the steadily advancing pauperization of the masses, that of a social cataclysm to come, and that of the unearned increment in the capitalists' incomes. As nobody within the Socialist ranks was able to disprove his arguments and conclusions, a great howling, and shouting, and gnashing of teeth arose within the Socialist party, and the old irreconcilable leaders began to call for the ostracism of the heretic. Below all the noise and animosity, however, was plainly perceptible the fear that Bernstein had the great mass of Socialism with him in this matter, and that, if the old leaders insisted upon his forcible removal from the party, it would be they who would be defeated. So, after a while, the open opposition against him and his teaching died down; a truce, if not indeed a peace, was declared between the warring factions, and, at the last party convention, the breach was patched up, and a sort of amicable understanding was tacitly established. A little while ago, Bernstein was elected to the Reichstag by one of the most influential and numerous Socialist constituencies in the empire, and he is now the acknowledged leader of the larger and more enlightened, as well as moderate, wing of the Socialist party in Germany.

Mr. von Schierbrand, who discusses this subject from an impartial point of view, points out that the German Socialists, even before the transformation of their programme, which has been just described, had repeatedly given proof that their aid could be gained for the asking in furthering and framing important legislation which was not in dissonance with their creed. The most striking instance of this readiness to cooperate was given under the *régime* of Count Caprivi, the only Chancellor who thus far has met the Socialists without prejudice. "Without their votes, Caprivi's system of commercial treaties could never have been passed. Yet it was this system which enabled Germany to start out on that brilliant industrial and commercial career which has been for a decade the marvel of the world. It was these same commercial treaties which the Kaiser, when conferring the order of the Black Eagle and a correspondingly high rank upon Caprivi, termed 'a real saving deed.'" Our author further testifies that much of the work done by the Socialists in the various legislative bodies of Germany, but, above all, in the Reichstag, redounds to the best interests of all classes in the empire, although, of course, their main efforts are directed toward benefiting their constituents, the laboring classes. "Their work," we read, "in the various committees of the Reichstag—they hold the Chairmanship of some of the most important—is more painstaking and conscientious than that of any other party, and it is so acknowledged. In acting as a radical leaven in the broad mass of tame subserviency which the majority of the Reichstag presents, they, consciously or unconsciously, accomplish a vast amount of good, and prepare the way for a more liberal general policy in the empire, but, above all, help greatly in preserving at least that modicum of freedom in speech, in the press and in religious worship which has survived the fourteen years of *quasi*-absolutist government inaugurated by the present Kaiser. Were the Socialists and their influence permanently removed from the Reichstag, it is hard to conceive to what depths of insanity and impotence that body would have sunk by now."

Our author does not attempt to predict what will be the final issue of the struggle which the Socialist party is making against all the powers of German government and German society. He deems it undeniable, however, that the party is making headway and gaining over to its ranks an increasing percentage of the cultivated middle classes. He also accounts in certain that, for the present at least, there is no prospect of a more liberal form and spirit of government in Germany, save through the efforts of the Socialist party. Shorn of its revolutionary character, freed from its former visionary features, and reduced to a programme of radical and democratic reform, he can see no reason why the party should not have a great future in store.